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ARGUMENT 
••-X ;i: POINT i. 
NO ISSUE WAS ALLEGED, TRIED OR DECIDED IN THE 
TRIAL COURT THAT ANY PART OF THE CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS. A PENALTY. > ' : ;.• 
The answer of Roberts, a general denial fails to 
allege any issue that the contract sued upon, or any part 
thereof, was invalid as a penalty. The plaintiff,, at 
the trial of this matter, attempted to introduce evidence 
as to the actual damages which could be reasonably anti-
cipated at the time the contract was made if the completion 
of the job was delayed, and the trial court refused on its 
own motion to hear such evidence (Tr. 1st day, pp. 5-6); 
furthermore, the respondent failed to "introduce or attempt 
to introduce any evidence as to the actual damages which 
could reasonably be anticipated in the event of delay in 
^completing the contract. :: ?.:•': ^*: ::.'•• fr.- ?-.;; i ~ : ; 
:•:•• The trial court made no findings below that any 
,-=: part of the contract between the parties was valid or 
, invalid as a penalty.; The respondent now asks this court 
to make such a finding without any issue, evidence or 
findings whatsoever decided, taken or made by the lower 
court. This court is an appeal court, not taking evidence, 
-2-
but deciding upon an established record whether or not 
a lower court erred in making findings and judgment based 
upon a record of evidence. Where no issue was raised in 
the pleadings, no evidence taken by the trial court nor 
findings made below, there is no issue before this court 
to be decided. 
Respondent correctly cites the rule that a 
liquidated damage clause must bear some relationship to 
the actual damages which could reasonably be anticipated 
at the time the contract was made, then, without there being 
any evidence in the record on what such anticipated actual 
damages would be, blithely makes the assertion that the 
liquidated damage clause does not contemplate any unfore-
seen damages which would not be fully compensated by the 
payment to the general contractor's costs and expenses. 
Such a statement ignores the realities within which a 
contractor must operate, such as overhead and bonding limi-
tations which prevent the bidding of additional jobs prior 
to certificates of completion being issued on existing 
jobs, and other factors not in the record. 
-3-f ,iA 
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' ' POINT II. • ' •.-.-• 
" - : ' THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE INCLEMENT 
WEATHER OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT COMPLAINED NEVER 
: IN FACT HAMPERED THE WELDING OR CAUSED THE IMPROPER 
WELDS WHICH CAUSED LEAKS. 
Appellant makes no great claim as to the fact 
that snow fell at the jobsite in question during the month 
of November, 1971. Such weather is usually expected in 
the Salt Lake area during November. The appellant does 
claim that both Patterson and Roberts testified that this 
inclement weather hampered welding on the pads and this 
was the reason for the bad welds, yet the welding on the 
jobs was completed by October 30, 1971. The next phase 
of the job was to put the pads under 150 pounds of air 
pressure, soap the welds and valves and re-weld any leaking 
welds. Neither Roberts nor Patterson made any claim that 
inclement weather held up this procedure (Tr. 2nd day, 
pp. 35-47). As to the welds and whether they tested out 
under pressure, Patterson, at Tr. 2nd day, p. 42, L. 2-11, 
deferred to a resident inspector and the daily records. A 
resident inspector who was on the job eight (8) hours a 
day testified during the third day of trial at pp. 22-24 
that the system was so full of leaks that an air compressor 
- 4 - • • . ' • 
couldn't pump air into it fast enough to attain 150 pounds 
of pressure, and Roberts' welder had to come back to remedy 
the problem. The records which were introduced from the 
State Building Board (Exhibit 48-P) never once mention 
valves as being a source of leaks, but only mention welds. 
The inclement weather which Roberts complained of working 
under during the month of November, 1971, would have never 
affected the work if Roberts had commenced fabrication of 
the pads on the job within two (2) days, or even a week, 
of August 27, 1971, the day he was requested to commence 
said work, rather than October 8, 1971, the day he actually 
commenced said work, a period of forty-two (42) days, 
nearly one-third (1/3) of the total days (120) required 
by the prime- contract ,to perform. .'-;... 
- i -With this undisputed evidence, the various findings 
by the trial court that there was no delay on the part of 
Roberts and that inclement weather caused delay on the 
part of Roberts, have no foundation in the evidence and 
should be modified accordingly. The appellant asked for 
the court to enter findings of fact that Roberts delayed 
the job in its motion to amend findings of fact, but the 
trial court refused. 
-5-
'. • v •• : •' -:-: '. - -POINT III. :•-"•...• 
IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF . 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
'- FINDINGS WHERE THE TRIAL IS TO THE COURT WITHOUT 
A JURY. 
The attacks made by the appellant upon all of the 
findings of fact of the trial court are primarily rooted 
in the sufficiency of evidence to support those findings. 
The trial court, in accordance with Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, made findings of fact upon 
which it based its judgment. Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to amend such 
findings and allows it to be made together with a motion 
for a new trial and also includes the following sentence: 
"When findings of fact are made in actions 
tried by the court without a jury, the ' \: ' 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence 
r r.} n L I: ' ~.; 3 : - : ~ to support the f ind ing s may the reafter be 
raised whether or not the party raising 
"to :nc-.: >>• j the question has made in the district court/ 
an objection to such findings or has made 
'~
v
 : ;'•: 'either a motion to amend them, a motion f or 
judgment or a motion for a new trial." 
None of the cases cited by the respondent in his 
brief with respect to amendments to findings or a motion 
for a new trial apply to the situation in the instant case. 
It is obvious that in drafting the foregoing rule, the 
drafters realized that a trial court, once it has made its 
-6-
decision upon its notes from the evidence, is not likely 
to change it, and-on questions of sufficiency of the 
evidence, the appellate court, because it can look at 
the cold record taken by a certified court reporter, can 
better evaluate the questions of sufficiency of the evidence 
than the trial court who must rely upon handwritten notes 
and memory impressions of the evidence. Rule 52(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should govern the appel-
late court decision with respect to the issues raised by 
the plaintiff as to the findings of fact, '." ' *>"••'•* • •" --• '-
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND CHALLENGED ALL OF 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH REFUSED •••-''-' 
TO ASSESS DAMAGES FOR DELAY ON THE PART OF ROBERTS. 
The trial court was asked in the motion of the 
appellant to amend findings of fact, to delete the finding 
that Leger's claim for delay was limited only to the heating 
panels or pads (R. p. 21). Appellant also asked the trial 
court to assess damages for Roberts' refusal to complete 
the gas line, failure to install promptly the heating panels 
in a workmanlike manner and Roberts' failure to complete 
the Salt Lake Road Shed job (R. p. 22). There is nothing 
- 7 -
in the record to show that a new trial would do anything 
other_than to re-hear the same evidence* /The questions 
raised on appeal were_.raised , in the, trial court. _- • * ,. . .. • 
POINT V. 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES WAS ERROR BY THE 
.:;••.....- .,LOWER. COURT,,;.;
 : /£*_ ;i;-; c/v -i: ;:- :. ->: ;•..-.-." 
:c Respondent states that section,14-1-8 of the Utah 
Xode Annotated (1953/, was ^ enacted to provide adequate 
compensation to a successful party who was forced, to sue 
for the recovery of payments due under a prime contract. 
It is clear from the record that Leger, as much as Roberts, 
was forced to sue because of defalcations of Roberts upon 
the contract, and to,obtain.an adjudication on liquidated 
damages. The summons and complaint were served upon Roberts 
on October 2, 1972, while the State Building Board still 
refused to issue its certificate of completion because of 
the failure of Roberts to complete his contract until 
February of 1972 (Tr. 2nd day, pp. 11-12). One can hardly 
believe that the legislature enacted section 14-1-8 to 
force a litigant to pay attorney's fees for the opposing 
party where there are proved breaches of contract by that 
opposing party and a legal basis in the contract between 
the parties for withholding the funds actually withheld. 
Appellant asserts that there is no particular "custom" as 
to the awarding of attorney's fees in bond law cases in 
the State of Utah; and even if there were such a "custom," 
the statutory law and Rules of Civil Procedure must 
necessarily nullify any "custom" of lawyers of the courts. 
To construe section 14-1-8 and rule otherwise asks this 
court to engage in judicial legislation which this court 
has wisely refused to do. 
Respondent, in arguing "just compensation" and 
"meaningless distinctions" asks this court to ignore the 
plain wording of section 14-1-8, which provides that 
attorney's fees shall be assessed as costs. The same 
arguments would have been applicable in the facts of 
Walker Bank and Trust Co. v. New York Terminal Warehouse 
Co., cited in appellant's and respondent's brief. The 
answer is simply that the statute and the rule require it 
by their plain terms. The legislature could have easily 
provided that attorney's fees be awarded to the prevailing 
-9-
party as part of its judgment, or merely awarded attorney's 
fees without specifying them as costs. .:. ... 
POINT VI. 
IF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST LEGER IS MODIFIED, ANY 
•'•.:• . JUDGMENT AGAINST THE SURETY, UNITED STATES . - •:.... 
FIDELITY AND GUARANTY, MUST ALSO BE MODIFIED. 
Suit was brought against the added defendant. 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty, upon a cross-claim 
based upon a surety bond written by defendant pursuant to 
Title 14, Chapter 1, sec. 5, Utah Code Annotated, alleging 
as grounds for recovery that Roberts furnished work and 
materials to Leger. The liability of the added defendant 
as to Claim I of defendant's counterclaim and cross-claim, 
was and is completely dependent upon the liability of its 
principal, leger, as no independent issues as to the bond 
existed in the lawsuit. Roberts, the creditor, is en-
titled to but one performance upon the bond, and if it 
receives that by payment or other satisfaction, the 
surety, United States Fidelity and Guaranty, is discharged, 
10 Williston on Contracts, 721 sec. 1219; Bushman Construction 
-10-
Co. v. Air Force Academy Housing, Inc., 325 F2d 481 
(CA10) (1964); see also 72 CJS 572-573/ sec. 92. \ . 
;;„.•;.- If this court modifies the obligation of Leger, 
the obligation of the surety, United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty, must also be modified even though it has been 
reduced to judgment. The reason is that the relationship 
of principal and surety is not terminated by reason of a 
judgment obtained against the principal and surety/, 
10 Williston on Contracts, 813 sec. 1254; 72 CJS 698, _-. "-
sec. 243. The courts will allow,a remedy to the surety 
where a.whole or part of the judgment against the principal 
has been satisfied or modified, Walin v. Young, Oregon 182 
P2d 535, 541. V* --> y -i//£ ,.,•:> j,.ni 3^^- :, ri^:: •--- k.- ££—; _...• 
:. - - In the case of Stolze v. United States Fidelity 
and Guaranty, Mo. 131 S2 915 (1910), the surety had posted 
^supersedeas bond for the payment of a judgment for a _r 
defendant on appeal. The appellate court modified the 
original judgment of $15,000.00 and another judgment for 
$8,000.00 was entered which sum the defendant offered to 
pay.. The plaintiff insisted on collecting interest on the 
$8,000.00 which amounted to $1,254.00 and thereafter pur-
sued both the defendant and its surety. The trial court 
- 1 1 - . .'.•• 
decided in favor of the plaintiff and entered judgment for 
$1,254.00 against both the defendant and the surety. The 
defendant alone appealed the trial court's decision and 
the surety failed to appeal. .'The Missouri Supreme Court 
held that no interest was due, reversed the judgment • - • • 
against the defendant, and reiaanded the matter to the 
trial court. The plaintiff then began execution upon the 
judgment against the surety and the trial court held that 
plaintiff could not enforce the judgment against the surety 
for the reason that the undertaking of the surety is •-•'— 
1. -:secondary only, and where the primary obligation had been 
::ruled as not being owed by an appellate court, the ' • — 
unappealed judgment against the surety was discharged and 
execution could not issue thereon. Even though the statute 
under which the bond was posted provided for joint and ;~™ 
several liability on the part of the principal and surety, 
the Missouri Supreme Court on appeal ruled that such ' 
wording does not destroy the equity between principal and 
surety that once the obligation of the principal is dis~ : 
charged, the surety is discharged also, affirming the trial 
court ruling, thus any modification of the judgment made 
-12-
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